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RIGHT OF PRIVACY CHALLENGES TO
PROSTITUTION STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
The abortion cases, Roe v. WadeI and Doe v. Bolton,2 led legal com-
mentators and feminists to speculate that prostitution statutes violate
the right of privacy recognized in those decisions.3 Although initially
successful in some cases, the right to privacy argument ultimately has
not prevailed in litigation challenging prostitution statutes. Other chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of prostitution statutes have also been
only marginally successful. Courts have recently considered whether
prostitution statutes are impermissibly vague,4 violate equal protec-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 197 (1973).
3. See W. BARNETT, SExuAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1973); J. JAMES, J. WITH-
ERS, M. HAFT, S. THEISS & M. OWEN, THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as J. JAMES]; Rosenbleet & Pariente, The Prostitution of the Criminal Law, I I AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 373 (1973).
4. "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)
(quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). See generally, Col-
lings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955); Note, The Void-
for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960); 62 HARV. L. REV. 77
(1948).
Although vagueness challenges to prostitution statutes have generally been unsuccessful, liti-
gants almost always raise the issue. Vagueness challenges have been most successful against ordi-
nances and statutes prohibiting loitering for the purpose of prostitution. See Morgan v. City of
Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (city ordinance provision prohibiting accosting and
soliciting for "lewd" and "immoral" purposes is unconstitutionally vague and severe; provision
prohibiting accosting and soliciting for prostitution is not unconstitutionally vague); Kirkwood v.
Loeb, 323 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (city disorderly conduct and loafing ordinances are
vague and overbroad); State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 570 P.2d 259 (1977) (statute that fails ade-
quately to define "prostitution" and "sexual activity" is facially void for vagueness); City of De-
troit v. Sanchez, 18 Mich. App. 399, 171 N.W.2d 452 (1969) (city ordinance prohibiting lewdly
following any person is void for vagueness); City of Detroit v. Bowden, 6 Mich. App. 514, 149
N.W.2d 771 (1967) (city ordinance prohibiting "known prostitute" from attempting to stop pedes-
trian or motor vehicle is void for vagueness). The following cases rejected vagueness challenges:
People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 338, 562 P.2d 1315, 138 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1977) (soliciting for
lewd act); Langley v. United States, 264 A.2d 503 (D.C. 1970) (procuring for purposes of "de-
bauchery or any other immoral act"); Tatzel v. State, 356 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1978) ("licentious sexual
intercourse"); Commonwealth v. King, - Mass. -, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977) (common night-walk-
ing); State v. Armstrong, 282 Minn. 39, 162 N.W.2d 357 (1968) (loitering with intent to solicit for
prostitution); Dinitz v. Christensen, 94 Nev. 230, 577 P.2d 873 (1978) (any person who solicits any
act of prostitution is a vagrant); People v. Smith, 89 Misc. 2d 754, 393 N.Y.S.2d 239 (App. Term
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tion,5 infringe upon freedom of speech,6 or impose cruel and unusual
1977), aft'd, 44 N.Y.2d 613, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 407 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1978) (loitering for purposes of
prostitution); State ex rel Juvenile Dep't v. D, 27 Or. App. 861, 557 P.2d 687 (1976), appeal ds-
missed, 434 U.S. 914 (1977) (loitering "in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the
purpose ... of prostitution"); Hensley v. City of Norfolk, 216 Va. 369, 218 S.E.2d 735 (1975)
(soliciting "to commit any act which is lewd, lascivious, indecent or prostitute"); City of Seattle v.
Jones, 79 Wash. 2d 626, 488 P.2d 750 (1971) (loitering for purposes of prostitution). See Note,
Anti-Prostitution Laws: New Conficts in the Fight 4gainst the World's Oldest Profession, 43 ALB.
L. REv. 360, 363-79 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Anti-Prostitution Laws]; 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159
(1977).
5. The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause prohibits arbitrary statutory classifi-
cations that do not promote valid legislative goals. See generally Dixon, The Supreme Court and
Equaliy: Legislative Classofcations, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 494 (1977); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword" In Search ofEvolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Termn-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 91 HARV. L. REv. (1977); Developments in the Lawn-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1065 (1969). Because most people prosecuted for prostitution offenses are women, see U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1977, at 183 (Released Oct. 18, 1978), many defend-
ants have challenged prostitution statutes on equal protection grounds. See generaly Rosenbleet
& Pariente, supra note 3, at 381-411; Anti-Prostitution Laws at 382-85, supra note 4; Note, The
Victim as Criminal- A4 Consideration of California's Prostitution Law, 64 CAL. L. REv. 1235,
1278-83 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Victim as Criminal. Courts have upheld prostitution statutes
that by their terms apply only to women, deferring to the legislative judgment that only female
prostitution presents a significant social problem. Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471, 306 N.E.2d 95
(1974) (federal constitution); Wilson v. State, 258 Ind. 3, 278 N.E.2d 569 (state constitution), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909, 912 (La. 1974) (federal constitution);
State v. Mertes, 60 Wis. 2d 414, 210 N.W.2d 741 (1973) (state constitution). Courts have also
upheld statutes that are facially gender neutral but apply only to the sellers of sex. Blake v. State,
344 A.2d 260 (DeL Super. Ct. 1975), afdsub nom. Hicks v. State, 373 A.2d 205 (1977); United
States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46 (D.C. 1975); United States v. Wilson, 342 A.2d 27 (D.C. 1975);
Commonwealth v. King, - Mass. -, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977). If gender neutral and nondiscrimi-
natory statutes are applied in a discriminatory fashion, however, they violate the equal protection
clause. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See Developments in the Law--Equal Protec-
tion, supra. Although some lower courts have found discriminatory application of facially gender-
neutral prostitution statutes, these findings generally have been reversed by higher courts. See
Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich. 1975); People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.
3d 338, 562 P.2d 1315, 138 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 342 A.2d 27 (D.C. 1975);
United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46 (D.C. 1975).
6. Several cases have challenged statutes that prohibit solicitation for prostitution on first
amendment, free speech grounds. Most courts have rejected these challenges, reasoning that be-
cause solicitation for prostitution is commercial advertising or may lead to the commission of a
crime, it is unprotected by the first amendment. See Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922
(E.D. Mich. 1975); United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46 (D.C. 1975); People v. Johnson, 60 I11.
App. 3d 183, 376 N.E.2d 381 (1978); Cherry v. State, 18 Md. App. 252, 306 A.2d 634 (1973). See
generally Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 3, at 378-79. For a discussion of the commercial
speech doctrine, see notes 203-09 infra and accompanying text. As long as prostitution is illegal,
states may constitutionally forbid advertising of prostitutes' services. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
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PRIVACY AND PROSTITUTION
punishment.7 This Note considers only the right to privacy challenge.
Section I briefly reviews the history of attempts to regulate prostitution
and details current legal treatment of prostitution in the United States.
Section II discusses a trial court decision that was later reversed, hold-
ing that prostitution statutes violate a constitutionally protected right of
privacy. Section III traces the development of the Supreme Court's
concept of a constitutionally protected right to privacy. Section IV
analyzes the argument that the right to privacy, as adumbrated by the
Supreme Court, encompasses private, noncommercial sexual activity
between consenting adults. Section IV also considers the impact of
prostitution's commercial aspects on the right of privacy argument.
Section V then examines recent state court treatment of the right to
privacy argument-including the reversal of the previously discussed
trial court decision-and concludes that it is unlikely that the right to
privacy doctrine provides a feasible avenue of attack on the constitu-
tionality of prostitution statutes.
I. CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT OF PROSTITUTION
In recent years political groups8 and legal commentators9 have called
for the repeal of prostitution statutes and other sexually repressive
laws."0 The National Organization for Women (NOW)1' and Call Off
7. The Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), declared unconstitu-
tional, under the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment, a statute
that criminalized the status of narcotics addiction. For an argument. analogizing the Robinson
statute to prostitution statutes, see Rosenbleet & Pariente supra note 3, at 379. Sumpter v. State,
261 Ind. 471, 306 N.E.2d 95 (1974) held that a statute defining prostitute to include any female
who lives in a house of ill fame did not punish the status of being a prostitute. Id at 476, 306
N.E.2d at 100.
8. The National Organization for Women (NOW), the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), and the National Task Force on Prostitution are working for legislative change. J.
JAMES, supra note 3, at 69-72. See also Nossa, Prostitution: Who is Hustling *hom?, 3 WOMEN:
J. LIBERATION 26 (1972).
9. See W. BARNETT, supra note 3; J. JAMES, supra note 3; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 328-31 (1968); Kaplan, The Edward G. Donley Memorial Lecture- Non- Vic-
tim Crime andthe Regulation of Prostitution, 79 W. VA. L. REV. 593 (1977); Rosenbleet & Pariente,
supra note 3; Victim as Criminal, supra note 5; Note, Criminal Law--The Principle of Harm and its
,4pplication to Laws Criminalizing Prostitution, 51 DEN. L.J. 235 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Princi-
ple of Harm]; Comment, Decriminalization fProstitution: The Limits of the Criminal Law, 55 OR.
L. REV. 553 (1976). See also Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 1410 (1974);
Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due
Process," 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490 (1971).
10. Today, most states do not attach criminal penalties to private, noncommercial sexual
intercourse (fornication) between consenting adults. See Appendix. But see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
Number 21
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Your Old Tired Ethics (COYOTE)' 2 contend that the state's criminal-
ization of prostitution is an inappropriate use of governmental re-
sources' 3 and that criminal sanctions should be applied to only those
activities that cause harm to others. ' 4 They have argued that criminal-
ization will not eliminate prostitution because punishing the prostitute
does not eliminate the demand for commercialized sex.' 5
ANN. § 798.03 (West 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-928 (1975). Some states have repealed their
statutes prohibiting consensual sodomy (generally defined as oral-genital or anal-genital sexual
contact). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. tit. 11 (1978) (sodomy is not a criminal offense); CONN. GEN.
STAT. tit. 53a (1979) (sodomy is not included in penal code). But see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A,
§ 13A-6-65 (Supp. 1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1978). Several states, however, have
retained a criminal sanction for sodomy between persons of the same sex but do not prohibit
heterosexual sodomy. See Appendix; e.g., KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3505 (Vernon 1971); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 510.100 (1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1978); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN, tit. 5,
§ 21.06 (Vernon 1974).
II. See note 8 supra.
12. COYOTE is a national prostitute's guild founded in San Francisco. Prostitutes also have
organized to work for decriminalization in Seattle, New York, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Sacra-
mento, Boston, and Ft. Lauderdale. J. JAMES, supra note 3, at 72-76.
13. See J. JAMES, su~pra note 3, at 22-23; H. PACKER, supra note 9, at 328-31; 63 IowA L. REV.
248, 261-62 (1977).
14. See H. PACKER, supra note 9, at 266-67; W. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 1-20; Principle of
Harm, supra note 9. See also Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963). Accord, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 23-24 (1963). This argument has
its basis in "one very simple principle":
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfer-
ing with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1951). Accord, H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
Contra, P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). See generally Richards, Commercial
Sex and the Rights of the Person: A MoralArgument/or the Decriminalization ofProstituion, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1979).
15. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 14, at 132; Esselstyn, Prostitution in the United
States, 1968 ANNALS 123, 129.
Most recent demands for legislative reform of prostitution statutes call for decriminalization
rather than legalization. Decriminalization would remove all criminal sanctions from acts of
prostitution involving adults and could provide for regulation by civil code as with other busi-
nesses. See J. JAMES, supra note 3, at 102-12; Kaplan, supra note 9, at 598-606. Reform groups
propose brothel licensing only as an interim measure, because it confers the benefit of legality on
the licenseholder without providing protections for the worker--the prostitute.
The legislative response to these demands has been to modernize the prostitution statutes; the
criminal sanctions remain. The most significant changes have been in response to equal protec-
tion arguments. Most states have reworded their prostitution statutes to make them facially gen-
der neutral. Compare, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.210 (1970) ("Prostitution includes the giving or
receiving of the body by a female for sexual intercourse for hire.") (repealed 1978) with ALASKA
STAT. § 11.66.100 (1978) ("A person commits the crime of prostitution if he engages in or agrees
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/8
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Increasingly, states are leaving decisions concerning sexual activity
to the participants, as long as the individuals are adults and capable of
making sexual decisions of their own volition. t6 The wide scale repeal
of fornication laws 7 and the increasingly frequent abolition of laws
prohibiting consensual sodomyI8 confirm this attitude. Those states
that retain fornication and sodomy statutes usually do not enforce these
laws unless the acts involve nonconsenting participants or observers. 19
English common law considered prostitution a spiritual concern with
which the secular law should not be involved.2" American society did
not regard prostitution as a significant 2 social problem until the post-
Civil War forces of industrialization, immigration, and urbanization
combined to lead large numbers of women into the profession.22 Early
or offers to engage in sexual conduct in return for a fee."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:82 (West
1974) ("Prostitution is the practice by a female of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with males for
compensation.") (Amended by Acts 1977, No. 49 § 1) with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:82 (West
Supp. 1980) ("Prostitution is: (a) The practice by a person 6f indiscriminate sexual intercourse
with others for compensation.").
In 1973 only nine states prohibited patronizing a prostitute, see Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra
note 3, 422-26 app.; today that number has risen to 20. See Appendix.
16. States that do not prohibit fornication and sodomy have retained criminal sanctions for
acts involving minors, force, and persons who are incapable of consenting. See, e.g., HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 707 note at 359-61 (1976) ("[The statute] deals only with sexual behavior which involves
(1) forcible compulsion, (2) imposition on a youth or other person incapable of giving meaningful
consent, or (3) offensive conduct."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11 note at 369-70 (Smith-Hurd 1972)
("[Pirotection of everyone from aggression, protection of children from abuse of their immaturity,
and the protection of the public from open affronts to generally accepted standards of behavior
provide the basis adopted for framing the code provisions."). As used in this Note, "consensual"
sexual activity refers to sexual conduct that does not involve minors, force, or persons incapable of
consenting.
17. See note 10 supra.
18. Id
19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, Comment at 205-07 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1953); H. PACKER,
supra note 9, at 301-12. But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), ae?'d mem, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (defendants, state prosecuting officials, did not contest
allegation that they would prosecute plaintiff homosexuals for private sodomitic acts between con-
senting adults). See note 16 supra.
20. Prostitution was classified as an ecclesiastical offense and could not be punished in the
common-law courts. Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 3, at 373 n.4 (citing statute of Circum-
specte agatis, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 4 (1285)). Today prostitution is not illegal in England, although its
public aspects are prohibited. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 14, at 132.
21. Prostitution has existed from the earliest days of American colonization, but was not
widespread. V. BULLOUGH & B. BULLOUGH, PROSTITUTION: AN ILLUSTRATED SOCIAL HISTORY
197-200 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BULLOUGH, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY].
22. See generally V. BULLOUGH, THE HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION 187-93 (1964); BULLOUGH,
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY, supra note 21, at 200-07; D. PIVAR, PURITY CRUSADE 18-25 (1973).
In the nineteenth century, concerns about the increased incidence of venereal disease led many
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American case law broadly defined prostitution as the act of a woman
offering her body for sexual intercourse for hire or for indiscriminate
sexual intercourse without hire. 3 Today, all states and the District of
Columbia prohibit prostitution in some manner.24 Most states prohibit
the private act of engaging in sex for money,25 the frequently public act
of offering to engage in sex for money,26 and the prostitution related
business activities of persons other than prostitutes.27
Most states outlaw the actual act of prostitution.28 A statute that pro-
hibits only the private sex act and not any of its public aspects is ex-
tremely difficult to enforce because conviction usually requires the
testimony of a participant in the sex act.29 To avoid this enforcement
doctors and law enforcement officials to urge states and cities to adopt reglementation-licensing
and regulation systems similar to those in effect at that time in Europe and England. St. Louis was
the only city to follow this suggestion. From 1870 to 1874, St. Louis licensed houses of prostitu-
tion and required women to submit to periodic health checks. Other cities adopted informal-and
illegal-segregation measures, confining brothels to one section of the city. BULLOtGH, ILLUS-
TRATED HISTORY, supra note 21, at 207. These measures were vehemently opposed by the "new
abolitionists"--women's groups working to eradicate prostitution. This early feminist movement
was at least partially responsible for the characterization of the prostitute as a "fallen woman."
See generaly D. PIVAR, supra. Ironically, today's feminists are a major force working to change
this image and decriminalize prostitution. See J. JAMES, supra note 3, at 68-71.
23. E.g., United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 401 (1908) ("It refers to women who for hire or
without hire offer their bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with men."); State v. Clark, 78 Iowa
492, 494, 43 N.W. 273, 273 (1889) ("[I]f a woman submits to indiscriminate sexual intercourse,
which she invites or solicits by word or act, or any device, she is a prostitute."); State v. Thuna, 59
Wash. 689, 690, 109 P. 331, 331 ("A woman who submits herself to indiscriminate sexual inter-
course with men, without hire, is certainly as much a common prostitute as one who does so solely
for hire.") aid, 59 Wash. 692, 111 P. 768 (1910). Contra, MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.2 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962) ("A person is guilty of prostitution . . . if he or she: (a) is an inmate of a
house of prostitution or otherwise engages in sexual activity as a business."). See id Comment at
236 ("[The code] no longer purports to reach every engagement in sexual activity for hire."). Cf
People v. Johnson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 183, 187, 376 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1978) ("[Ain offer or agreement
to receive money, rather than, for example, a fur coat or a night at the opera for sexual favors is
essential to a prostitution conviction.").
24. See Appendix. Nevada is the only state in which one may legally engage in prostitution,
Legalized, licensed brothels operate in two rural counties. Prostitution is illegal, even in those
counties, if it occurs outside the licensed facilities. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 207.030, 201.300-430
(1975). See J. JAMES, supra note 3, at 70.
25. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82(a) (West 1974); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.24 (Page
1975). See notes 29-31 infra; Appendix.
26. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-202 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-15 (Smith-Hurd
1979). See notes 32-35 infra.
27. See notes 36-42 infra and accompanying text.
28. See Appendix.
29. See Holloway v. City of Birmingham, 55 Ala. App. 568, 574, 317 So. 2d 535, 540 (1975)
(if there is "no bedroom affair, no disrobing, no touching of the bodies, no money paid, and no
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/8
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problem, modem statutes typically define prostitution to include offer-
ing or agreeing to engage in a sex act for money;30 thus, police may use
decoys, as well as participants' testimony, to obtain convictions under
these laws. A few statutes define any prostitute as a vagrant. 31
Solicitation for prostitution is illegal in all jurisdictions in the United
States, 32 including those which do not criminalize the actual act of en-
gaging in sex for money. 33 These statutes attempt to strike at the as-
pects of prostitution that may be most offensive to the public, although
they prohibit all negotiations, whether public or private.34 Police of-
ficers typically enforce negotiation statutes by posing as customers, ar-
resting the prostitute when she names a price or a specific act.
Because sexual contact is not essential for prosecution, these statutes
are the easiest to enforce.
All states prohibit prostitution related business activities. Some stat-
utes include the common-law offenses of pimping, 36 pandering,37 and
sexual activity," prostitution has not been committed); State v. Butler, 331 So. 2d 425, 429 (La.
1976) (conviction requires proof of specific act of sexual intercourse). But see State v. Lewis, 343
So. 2d 1056, 1058 (La. 1977) ("No act of sexual intercourse is required for proof of prostitution.").
30. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.66.100 (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2012 (1977); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 567.010-.020 (1978). See Appendix.
31. Eg.. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.725 (West 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1119 (1975); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 207.030 (1977). See Appendix. See also State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1976);
State v. Perry, 249 Or. 76, 436 P.2d 252 (1968).
32. See Appendix. But see Adams v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 257, 208 S.E.2d 742 (1974)
(construing VA. CODE § 18.2-346 (prohibiting solicitation) to require evidence of attempt to com-
mit act of prostitution).
33. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1973); see Appendix.
34. See notes 218-221 infra and accompanying text.
Eleven states prohibit loitering for the purpose of prostitution. See Appendix. An overt act of
solicitation is usually unnecessary to violate these statutes. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 13A-11-
9(a)(3) (1975) ("A person commits the crime of loitering if he: ...(3) Loiters or remains in a
public place for the purpose of engaging or soliciting another person to engage in prostitution
...."); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2914 (1977) ("A person commits the crime of loitering if he:...
(e) lingers or remains in a public place for the purpose of engaging or soliciting another person to
engage in prostitution."). Contra, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2905(A)(1) (1978) ("A person
commits loitering if such person: . . . solicits another person to engage in any sexual offense.").
35. See. e.g., Dinkins v. United States, 374 A.2d 292 (D.C. 1977); People v. Johnson, 60 Ill.
App. 3d 183, 376 N.E.2d 381 (1978). See also J. JAMEs, supra note 3, at 50-52; H. PACKER, supra
note 9, at 329-31.
36. Pimping usually refers to sharing the earnings of a prostitute and procuring customers for
a prostitute. See. e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-206 (1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.2 (West
1979).
37. Pandering refers to arranging for or inducing another person to become a prostitute. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-203 (1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2705 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 725.3 (West 1979).
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other business activities under the term "promoting prostitution,"
which usually has several degrees ranging from misdemeanors to felo-
nies.38 Red light abatement acts39 allow civil nuisance abatement pro-
ceedings to be brought against premises used for prostitution.40 City
ordinances, 41 in addition to state statutes, regulate or prohibit massage
parlors.42
Traditionally, courts and commentators considered the prostitute's
customer to be a lesser social evil than the prostitute because the cus-
tomer's activity was merely occasional, but the prostitute's conduct
amounted to a continuous business.43 Today, however, many states
38. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.66.110-.130 (1978); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 712.1201-04
(1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-4 (Bums 1979).
39. See, e:g., Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 233.010, .020 (1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 567.080 (1978); 68
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 467 (Purdon 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-30-1 (1970).
40. See generally O'Connor, The Nuisance Abatement Law as a Solution to New York Cit's
Problem of Illegal Sex Related Businesses in the Mid-Town Area, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1977);
1978 DET. C.L. REV. 135.
41. See Brown v. Haner, 410 F. Supp. 399, 400 n.3 (W.D. Va. 1976) (citing ROANOKE, VA.
ORDINANCES § 15 (1976) (massage by person of opposite sex prohibited)); Brown v. Brannon, 399
F. Supp. 133, 139-46 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (citing DURHAM, N.C. CITY CODE ch. 3, art. V, § 13-31
(1975) (prohibiting genital massage for hire and requiring licensing of all massage businesses));
Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922, 930-31 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (citing DETROIT, MICH.,
CITY ORDINANCES §§ 34-1-1, -4, -10, 1-1-7 (1965) (prohibiting operation of massage parlor with-
out license and requiring finding of good moral character before license may be issued)); Garaci v.
City of Memphis, 379 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 n.2 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (citing MEMPHIS, TENN., PRIV.
ACTS ch. 234, §§ 2, 4, 5 (1961) (requiring licensing of massage parlors contingent on owner's
demonstration of good moral character)); Wes Ward Enterprises v. Andrews, 42 I11. App. 3d 458,
462-63, 355 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1976) (citing PEORIA, ILL., ORDINANCES § 16-164 (1974) (licensing
and regulating massage parlors)).
Many city ordinances also prohibit prostitution, solication for prostitution, and loitering for the
purposes of prostitution. See, e.g., Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922, 926 (E.D. Mich.
1975) (citing DETROIT, MICH., CITY ORDINANCES § 39-1-52 (1965) (prohibiting accosting and
soliciting for prostitution)); State v. Armstrong, 282 Minn. 39, 40, 162 N.W.2d 357, 358-59 (1968)
(citing MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCES §§ 870.010, .050 (1968) (prohibiting loitering for pur-
poses of prostitution and lurking for purposes of mischief)); Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d
298, 302, 437 P.2d 434, 437 (1978) (citing SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, REV. ORDINANCES § 32-2-1(7)
(1965) (prohibiting directing any person to any place or building for purpose of prostitution));
Hensley v. City of Norfolk, 216 Va. 369, 371 n.l, 373-74 nn.3-4, 218 S.E.2d 735, 738 n.1, 739 nn.3-
4 (1975) (citing NORFOLK, VA., CITY CODE §§ 31-18, -56, -55 (1958) (prohibiting keeping disor-
derly house, soliciting for prostitution, frequenting house of ill-fame)); City of Seattle v. Jones, 79
Wash. 2d 626, 627-28, 488 P.2d 750, 751 (1971) (citing SEATTLE, WASH., CITY CODE § 12.49.019
(1968) (prohibiting loitering for purpose of prostitution)).
42. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of massage parlor regulation, see 24 U.
KAN. L. REV. 462 (1976).
43. See Exparte Carey, 57 Cal. App. 297, 306, 207 P. 271, 274 (1922) ("The fact that the
fallen woman carries on the business of commercialized vice justifies whatever discriminations
may be found in the statute. The act of her partner in vice, while equally as nefarious, is neither
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prohibit patronizing a prostitute" and some appellate courts have up-
held solicitation convictions against patrons of prostitutes.45
II. TRIAL COURT CASES INVALIDATING PROSTITUTION STATUTES
A few trial courts have held prostitution statutes unconstitutional on
right-to-privacy grounds,46 but have been reversed by appellate
courts.4 7 Generally, these trial courts first considered whether a per-
son's constitutionally protected right of privacy encompasses a decision
to engage in noncommercial sexual activity. Answering that question
affirmatively, these courts then subjected the challenged statutes to
strict scrutiny and ruled that the state had failed to show that the stat-
ute was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
In In re P.,4s a proceeding to determine whether respondent should
be declared a delinquent, a New York family court held that the state
constitution precluded criminalization of private, commercial sexual
activity.49 The case concerned a female juvenile who offered to per-
commercialized nor continuous."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12, Comment 8 at 180 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959) ("Imposition of severe penalties [for the patron] is out of the question, since prosecu-
tors, judges and juries would be likely to regard extra-marital intercourse for males as a necessary
evil or even as socially beneficial.").
44. Twenty states presently prohibit patronizing a prostitute. See Appendix. Iowa defines
the crime of prostitution to include the patron: "Prostitution: A person who sells or offers for sale
his or her services as a partner in a sex act, or who purchases or offers to purchase such services,
commits an aggravated misdemeanor." IowA CODE ANN. § 725.1 (1979) (emphasis added). Ac-
cord, OR. REV. STAT. § 167.007(b) (1977); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.02 (Vernon Supp.
1978).
45. Leffel v. Municipal Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1976); Williams v.
United States, 342 A.2d 367 (D.C. 1975).
46. Eg., United States v. Moses, 41 U.S.L.W. 2298 (Nov. 3, 1972), rev'd, 339 A.2d 46 (D.C.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920 (1976); In re P., 92 Misc. 2d 62, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Fam. Ct.
1977), rev'd, 68 A.D.2d 719, 418 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1979).
47. See cases cited note 46 supra.
48. 92 Misc. 2d 62, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Faro. Ct. 1977), rev'd, 68 A.D.2d 719, 418 N.Y.S.2d
597 (1979).
49. Id at 82-83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 469. The court based its decision on the New York state
constitution, which, like the federal constitution, contains no textual reference to privacy. The
court traced the development of the federal right and held that the reasoning applied equally to
the state constitution. Id at 75-76, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65. This reliance on the state constitution
was necessary to distinguish Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 430 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), af'dmem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); see notes 161-77 infra and accompanying text. Doe upheld
Virginia's prohibition of private, consensual sodomy. The act of prostitution charged in In re P
was also sodomy, although the parties, in contrast to Doe, were of opposite sexes. 92 Misc. 2d at
76 n.21, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 465 n.21.
The court also found a pattern of "intentional and selective enforcement" against women,
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form oral sodomy for an adult male patron in exchange for ten dol-
lars.50 That act, if committed by an adult, would have violated the state
prostitution statute and would, therefore, require a finding of delin-
quency.5 ' The court, however, found that the right of privacy protects
"each individual's decision as to whether, when and in what manner he
or she will engage in private intimate relations."52 For purposes of this
right, the court drew no distinctions between commercial and noncom-
mercial acts or between "deviate" and "normal" acts.53
Applying strict scrutiny to New York's prostitution statute,5 4 the
court then examined the state's asserted justifications for its interfer-
ence with the individual's fundamental right to engage in private inti-
mate relations. The court agreed that the state had valid interests in
preventing venereal disease, controlling organized and ancillary crimi-
nal activity, and protecting the family and morals of society,-' but
found these interests insufficient to support governmental interference
with the individual's right of privacy. A complete prohibition of prosti-
tution to eradicate the relatively small incidence of venereal disease
attributable to prostitution was unreasonable. 6 The state had not sus-
tained its burden of showing that prostitution leads to other crimes5 7 or
is associated with organized crime.5 Nor had the state shown any em-
pirical connection between prostitution and harm to the stability of the
which violated the state constitution's equal protection clause. Id at 71-72, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 462,
In addition, the court held that the state sodomy statute violated the equal protection clause of the
state and federal constitutions because it applied only to unmarried persons. 1d at 73-74, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 463-64. Even if sodomy were not a crime, however, respondent could have been
adjudged delinquent. Performance of an act of "deviate sexual intercourse" in return for a fee
violates the prostitution statute. Id at 65-66, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
50. 92 Misc. 2d at 65, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 457. The court noted that the patron, who was the
complaining witness in the case, had not been charged with patronizing a prostitute, attempting a
statutory rape, or endangering the welfare of a minor. Id at 65 n.3, 71 n.13, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 457
n.3, 462 n.13. The court expressed outrage that an adult male could agree to pay a fourteen year-
old girl $10 to engage in oral sodomy and then have the child prosecuted for prostitution. Re-
spondent was also charged with robbery for taking an additional $30 from the complaining wit-
ness. Id at 65 n.1, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 457 n.1.
51. 52 Misc. 2d at 65-66, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
52. Id at 75, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
53. See id
54. Id at 76-77, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65.
55. See Id at 77, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
56. Id at 77-78, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
57. I1d at 78-79, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
58. Id at 79-80, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
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traditional family. 59 Finally, the court held that the state could use
means less intrusive than complete prohibition of prostitution to
achieve its legitimate goal of protecting the public from offensive solici-
tation.60
In re P. demonstrates that the right of privacy challenge to prostitu-
tion statutes is not simply academic speculation. The applicability of
the right of privacy doctrine to prostitution statutes depends initially on
two determinations: (1) that the decision to engage in nonpublic, non-
commercial, consensual sexual activity is a "fundamental" right en-
compassed by the constitutionally protected right of privacy; and (2)
that the state either lacks sufficient interests to interfere with this right
in any particular manner 61 or could employ means less intrusive than
those legislatively chosen to achieve its ends. Once the decision to en-
gage in private, noncommercial, consensual sexual activity is found to
be a "fundamental" right, it is then necessary to evaluate whether pros-
titution's commercial nature affects either conclusion-that is, whether
the noncommercial ingredient of sexual activity is a necessary compo-
nent of the right, or whether the commercial aspect of prostitution en-
larges the state's interests to the extent necessary to sustain prostitution
statutes. At the crux of the entire analysis, however, is the Supreme
Court's concept of a constitutional right of privacy.
III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment6 2 "affords not
only a procedural guarantee against the deprivation of 'liberty,' but
likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional
restrictions by the State."63 Although the Supreme Court will sustain
59. id at 80-81, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 468. The court agreed that preservation of the family unit
as the "central institution for social cooperation" is a legitimate state goal. Because most patrons
are married men, the family might be harmed by the existence of prostitution. The court con-
cluded, however, that the responsibility for any undermining of the family unit attributable to
prostitution should be placed on the patron, not on the prostitute who, under present enforcement
practices, is the party most frequently arrested. Id. See notes 222-26 infra. The court also cited
studies showing no ill effects on the family unit from legalization of prostitution in other countries
or from decriminalization of prostitution in New York. 92 Misc. 2d at 80-81, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
60. Id. at 82-83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
61. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. Rev. 34, 36-40.
62. "[Njor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
63. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976). During the first part of this century in what
Number 21 449
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state economic regulations if there is any conceivable rational basis for
the legislation,64 the Court subjects legislation infringing on "funda-
mental" rights65 to a stricter standard of review. Such legislation must
be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.6 6 The Court pres-
ently recognizes as "fundamental" the individual's right to freedom of
association,67 electoral participation,68 interstate travel, 69 procedural
fairness in criminal proceedings, 70 and personal privacy. The right of
privacy, in the Court's language, protects "the personal intimacies of
the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child
rearing."7 1
is now known as the Lochner era, an activist Supreme Court used substantive due process to strike
down many state economic regulations. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Seegener.
ally Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L.
REv. 13 (1958); McCloskey, supra note 61. The Court's retreat from that position began in the
mid-1930's'with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and was completed in 1955 with Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), which established that the Court not only would
defer to the legislative judgment that an economic regulation had a rational relationship to a
legitimate state end, but would do so if any conceivable set of facts supported that relationship.
64. See McCloskey, supra note 61.
65. Rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969),
are fundamental. See notes 66-71 infra and accompanying text.
66. "Substantive" equal protection analysis uses the same two-tier system of review. See
Gunther, supra note 5; Karst, supra note 5, Developments in the Lawi-Equal Frotection, supra note
5. To a certain extent the characterization of the interest is outcome-determinative. See Note,
Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Princi4le?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1166-67 (1974). "To
challenge such lines by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I
am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one
ever will." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But see Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state interest in potential life of the fetus is compelling at point of
fetus' viability).
67. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (state order requiring NAACP to dis-
close membership list may curtail freedom to associate and is thus subject to the closest judicial
scrutiny).
68. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (statute requiring payment of
poll tax to vote in state elections abridges fundamental right and is subject to strict scrutiny).
69. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (residency requirement for welfare benefits
infringes on potential recipients' right to travel interstate and is thus subject to strict scrutiny).
70. E.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right to access to legal materials and courts);
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (right to transcript in misdemeanor appeals); Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel in first appeal).
71. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973). See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (marriage); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (procreation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (home); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contracep-
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The Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the right of privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut ,72 in which it held unconstitutional a state stat-
ute forbidding the use of contraceptives by married couples. 3 Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, derived the right from the zone of pri-
vacy emanating from penumbras of the first, third, fourth, and fifth
amendments.74 The Court ruled that Connecticut's statute interfered
with a relationship lying within this constitutionally protected zone
and, therefore, was unconstitutional.75 Three other Justices regarded
the right of privacy as fundamental and preserved to the public by the
ninth amendment.76 Justice Harlan found the right to be "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," and so rooted in the traditions of soci-
ety as to be ranked fundamental.77 Also concurring separately, Justice
White viewed the "liberty" interest of the fourteenth amendment as
providing a right "to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the mar-
riage relationship."78
In Griswold the marital relationship triggered the privacy protec-
tion;79 four years later in Stanley v. Georgia,80 a place-the home-
triggered the same protection for possession of obscene materials.8 ' Ei-
tion); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (child-rearing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child rearing).
72. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Although the right of privacy first gained acceptance by a majority
of the Court in Griswold, the concept was not new. Justice Harlan had discussed it in his dissent-
ing opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), referring to an
even earlier dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis found a "right to be let alone" in the protections
of the fourth and fifth amendments, describing it as "the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." Id See also Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) (elaborating private tort concept of privacy rather than a constitutional
right). The Court previously had recognized due process rights, "to marry, establish a home and
bring up children," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922), and to direct the education of one's
children, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
73. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74. Id at 480-86.
75. Id at 485.
76. Id at 486-99.
77. Id at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. Id at 502-03 (White, J., concurring).
79. "The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id at 485 (emphasis added).
80. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
81. Id at 565. Some commentators suggested that the Griswold decision was also based on
the sanctity of the place involved. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf .4 Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword" Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973); Wilkinson &
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senstadi v. Baird82 subsequently extended the right of privacy beyond
the bounds of the marital relationship, holding that Massachusetts' pro-
hibition on the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was
constitutionally impermissible.8 3  Because the right of privacy estab-
lished in Griswold inhered in the individual rather than in the marital
relationship, a statutory classification based on marital status denied
unmarried persons the equal protection of the laws. 4 In 1973 the
Court, in Roe v. Wade,85 held that the choice of pregnancy termination
was a fundamental personal right of the individual woman that fell
within the zone of privacy protection. 6 The right of privacy recog-
nized in Roe reaffirms Eisenstadt's location of the right in the individ-
ual and may be characterized as a right of autonomy 87-- a fundamental
right to make certain personal choices free from governmental interfer-
ence. 8 Subsequent cases have applied the right of privacy to procrea-
White, Constitutional Protectionfor Personal Lifesiyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977); Note,
supra note 66. The language supporting this view is in Justice Douglas' opinion: "Would we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives?" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
82. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
83. Id at 453. Thus, the absence of a protected relationship was not dispositive.
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relation-
ship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emo-
tional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id (emphasis in original).
84. Id at 446-47.
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. Id at 154. The Court recognized that the right was not unlimited. See text accompany-
ing notes 112-116 infra.
87. See Henkin, supra note 9.
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)
("The cases... [recognize] the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.") (footnotes omitted).
A complete discussion of the Court's rationale and the constitutional reasoning in the develop-
ment of the right of privacy is beyond the scope of this Note. For thorough analyses of the cases,
see generally Craven, Personhood" The Right To Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699; Ely, supra
note 81; Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975); Henkin,
supra note 9; Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53
B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973); Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689 (1976); Tribe, supra note 81; Wil-
kinson & White, supra note 81; Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecdfed Rights. On Protect-
ing Fundamental and Not-So-Fundamental 'Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Conception
of Equal Protection, 1977 DUKE L.J. 143; Note, supra note 66.
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tion decisions, 9 marriage,9" and certain aspects of family life."
Generally, the Court has used a catalogue approach to determine
interests protected by the right of privacy. After listing activities and
interests included within the right of privacy through its previous deci-
sions, the Court compares the interest litigated in a particular case with
the "list."92 Thus, in Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton,9 3 the Court found
that the right of privacy protects "the personal intimacies of the home,
the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing"94
but does not include the viewing of obscene movies in a public thea-
ter 95
Under the "list" approach, however, the Court has failed to elabo-
rate the essential characterists of the activities and interests encom-
passed by the right of privacy. Stanley established that the right of
privacy includes the right to be free from governmental intrusion into
activity within the home.96 Griswold focused not only on a protected
place, but also on a protected relationship.97 Eisenstadt and the abor-
tion cases, however, posit a right of privacy that transcends places and
relationships-a right that, in essence, amounts to a right of auton-
omy.98 Carey v. Population Services International99 conforms to this
view of the right of privacy. The Carey Court did not find a constitu-
tional right to use contraceptives; rather, it held that access to contra-
ceptives was essential to exercise the "fundamental" right to make the
procreation decision."°
89. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptives); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (abortion).
90. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
91. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
92. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
93. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
94. Id at 65.
95. Id at 69. Likewise, in Roe the Court stated that the right of privacy "has some extension
to activities relating to marriage. . . . procreation, . . . contraception, . . . family relationships,
and child rearing and education." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
96. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
99. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
100. Id at 688. Carey invalidated three provisions of a New York statute. Justice Brennan
wrote for a majority, including Justices Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, White, Powell. and Stevens,
to hold invalid a provision banning distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to adults by
anyone other than a licensed pharmacist and a second provision banning advertisement of contra-
ceptives. 431 U.S. at 682-91, 700-02. As to the provision forbidding distribution, except by a
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The Supreme Court's failure to elaborate beyond the "list" has pro-
vided little guidance for lower courts faced with arguments advocating
expansion of the right of privacy.' 0 ' The Court's recent privacy cases
concerned activities and interests previously brought within the right'0 2
and did not broaden privacy protection beyond the contents of the
Paris "list."1 0 3 In one case °4 the Court observed that the right of pri-
vacy "decisions establish that the constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 5 Yet, this "deeply
rooted in history and tradition" test does not explain the abortion
physician, of all nonmedical contraceptives to persons under the age of 16, however, there was no
majority opinion. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun subjected the statute to
strict scrutiny and found that the provision was an impermissible burden on a minor's right to
access to contraceptives-a right deemed fundamental. Id at 691-96. Justice White concurred in
the judgment because he found the state had not sustained its burden of showing that the prohibi-
tion actually achieved its asserted goal of deterring teenage premarital sex. Id at 702-03 (White,
J., concurring in the result). Justice Powell also concurred in the judgment, finding that the statute
violated the rights of married teenagers between the ages of 14 and 16. New York law permitted
marriage at age 14, but the challenged statute applied to married as well as unmarried teenagers,
Justice Powell also found that the statute interfered with the rights of parents to raise their teenage
children, because it would forbid parental distribution of contraceptives. Id at 703-12 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the result). Justice Stevens also concurred in the result, finding that the statute
attempted to impose pregnancy as punishment for teenage sexual activity and, therefore, denied
due process. Id at 712 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Burger and Rehnquist
dissented from all parts of the decision. Id at 702 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 717-19 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). See Note, Carey v. Population Services International: An Extension o/the
Right of 'rivacy, 5 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 167 (1978); Note, Carey, Kidr and Contraceptives. Privacy's
Problem Child, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 750 (1978).
101. See generally Ely, supra note 81; Note, supra note 66. Lower courts have faced argu-
ments advocating extension of the right to various other activities. See, e.g., Williams v. Kleppe,
539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976) (nude bathing at public beach); Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp.,
523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975) (father's presence in delivery room during birth of child); State v.
Erickson, 574 P.2d I (Alaska 1978) (possession of cocaine in home); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494
(Alaska 1975) (possession of marijuana in home); Locker v. Kirby, 31 Cal. App. 3d 520, 107 Cal,
Rptr. 446 (1973) (topless waitress in bar); Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney v. 46th Judicial
Dist. Judge, 76 Mich. App. 318, 256 N.W.2d 776 (1977) (gambling); American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Davids, II Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968) (motorcycle helmet law).
102. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977) (abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family).
103. See note 94 supra and accompanying text. See also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976) (city may regulate length of policemen's hair); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I
(1974) (city may regulate through zoning number of unrelated individuals who may live together);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no fundamental right to housing); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (no fundamental right to welfare).
104. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
105. Id at 503.
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cases, 10 6 nor does it explain the invalidity-as an infringement of indi-
viduals' right of privacy-of the anti-miscegenation statute in Loving v.
Virginia.07 Some commentators suggest that in determining whether a
particular interest is within the scope of the right of privacy, the Court
measures that interest's impact on the individual's life.'0 8 Certainly,
the decision to marry or to have children significantly affects the life of
the decisionmaker, but education' 0 9 and public assistance t' 0 also sub-
stantially influence the course of an individual's life; nevertheless, the
Court has not deemed these interests to be within the protection of the
right of privacy."'
The right of privacy recognized in Griswold and the cases following it
is not absolute. Once an interest is classified as within the right of pri-
vacy, the state may interfere with that interest upon a showing that the
interference is necessary to achieve a compelling state end.112 In Gris-
wold the Court rejected the state's claim that its ban on the use of con-
traceptives by married persons was necessary to deter extramarital
sexual activity."' Although Connecticut had a valid interest in the
morals of its citizens, its statute was not a necessary means to achieve
that goal." 4 In Roe the Court held that the state interest in maternal
106. Although Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe detailed the history of abortion laws to
show their relatively recent origins, 410 U.S. at 119-47, the evidence does not make convincing the
argument that the right to abortion is, under the test forumlated in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, "deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition." See 410 U.S. at 119-47.
107. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court overturned a criminal conviction under Virginia's miscege-
nation statute, ruling the statute unconstitutional. In Roe, Justice Blackmun cited Loving as a
demonstration of the right of privacy's "extension to activities relating to marriage." 410 U.S. at
152. Interracial marriages in the United States have been rare until recent times. See Brief for
Appellee, at 28, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
108. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 81; Note, supra note 81.
109. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no funda-
mental right to equal education under equal protection clause).
110. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (no fundamental right to receive welfare
payments).
11l. For an argument that the courts should recognize a constitutional right to "certain basic
ingredients of individual welfare, such as food, shelter, health care, and education," see
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659. Contra, Ap-
pleton, Commentary: Professor Michelman's Questfor a Constitutional We/fare Right, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 715; Bork, Commentary: The Impoasibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695. For an argument that education is entitled to special constitutional pro-
tection, see Levin, Commentary: Education as a Constitutional Entitlement: .4 Proposed Judicial
Standardfor Determining How Much is Enough, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 703.
112. See note 66 supra.
113. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 506 (1965).
114. Id at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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health did not become compelling until after the first trimester of preg-
nancy." '5 A state, therefore, may interfere with abortion decisions only
during the second and third trimesters."16
IV. THE HYPOTHETICAL RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY
In the wake of the Supreme Court's pioneering efforts to establish a
right of privacy doctrine, case law is emerging to support the notion
that constitutionally protected privacy encompasses the right to engage
in private, consensual, sexual activity. The Supreme Court, however,
has not elaborated a basis for distinguishing private, sexual activity
from "personal intimacies of the home.""' 7 Yet, Griswold's emphasis
on the state's intrustion into the marital bedchamber" 8 has led many
states to revise their sodomy statutes to exempt married couples. 19 Al-
though dicta in various Supreme Court opinions suggests that "illicit"
sexual activity might still be prohibited, 120 some lower courts have con-
strued the right of privacy doctrine to protect private, consensual, non-
procreational sexual activity between married couples. 121 Two state
supreme courts have extended this rationale to prohibit state interfer-
ence with private, consensual sexual activity between unmarried per-
115. 410 U.S. at 163.
116. Id at 163-64.
117. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).
118. See note 81 supra.
119. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A § 13A-6-60(2) (Supp. 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.002
(McKinney 1975).
120. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 702 (1977) (White, J., concurring) ("I do
not regard the opinion, however, as declaring unconstitutional any state law forbidding extramari-
tal sexual relations."); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68n.15 (1973) ("The state
statute books are replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws against prostitution .... al-
though [prostitution] may only directly involve 'consenting adults.' "); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The State of Connecticut does have statutes,
the constitutionality of which is beyond doubt, which prohibit adultery and fornication."); id at
505 (White, J., concurring) ("[ihe State's policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual
relationships ... [is] concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal."); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I would not suggest that adultery, homosexual-
ity, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced,").
121. See, e.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), rev'don other grounds sub nor. Wade
v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v. Lair,
62 NJ. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973). But see Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976)
(husband and wife waived their right to marital privacy for act of oral sodomy by allowing third
party to be present); State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 110, 547 P.2d 6, 9 (1976) (state may not
interfere with "sexual behavior" but may regulate "sexual misconduct," including consensual sod-
omy between spouses).
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sons of the opposite sex. 12 2 Going even further, a recent New York
decision extends this protection of the right of privacy to private, con-
sensual, homosexual conduct.
123
In State v. Pilcher24 the Iowa Supreme Court held Iowa's sodomy
statute125 unconstitutional as applied to oral sodomy between con-
senting,126 unmarried'27 adults of opposite sexes.' 28  The Iowa court
first found that the Supreme Court's right of privacy doctrine applies to
some sexual activity.' 29 It then looked to three lower federal court de-
cisions"' holding sodomy statutes unconstitutional as applied to mar-
ried couples. 3' Finally, the court ruled that because the right of
privacy extends to sexual relations between married couples, 3 2 Eisen-
stadt v. Baird mandated a finding that the right also protects the "man-
ner of sexual relations performed in private between consenting adults
of the opposite sex not married to each other."'1
33
122. State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d
333 (1977). See also State v. Hill, 166 N.J. Super. 224, 399 A.2d 667 (Law Div. 1978).
123. People v. Onofre, - A.D.2d -, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980).
124. 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).
125. IOWA CODE ANN. § 705.1 (West 1979).
126. Defendant denied participating in the act, and the complaining witness claimed she had
not consented to oral sodomy, although she would have agreed to "normal" sexual intercourse.
242 N.W.2d at 350. The court was unable to determine from the jury's general verdict of guilt
whether the act was consensual. Because the jury could have found consent, the court granted
defendant standing to challenge the statute as applied to a consensual act. Id at 354-56.
127. Both participants were married to other people. Id at 351. The marital status of the
parties was irrelevant to the statutory violation. Id at 352.
128. Defendant stated that he was not challenging the act as applied to homosexual activity or
anal sodomy. Id at 352.
129. Id at 357.
130. Filcher relied on Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.) (state cannot prohibit consen-
sual sodomy between wife and husband), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Buchanan v. Batchelor,
398 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (sodomy statute unconstitutional as applied to married inter-
venors), rey'd on other grounds sub nomt. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971), and also dis-
cussed Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973) (right of privacy extends to consensual
sexual relations between adults), afd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
In Lovisi, the district court held that defendants waived their right of privacy as husband and wife
to engage in private consensual sodomy by showing photographs of the acts to their daughters.
Id at 626-27. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the right of privacy encompassed private
acts between marriage partners, but found that the Lovisis waived their rights by allowing another
person to observe and participate in sexual activities. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). See 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 839 (1977).
131. State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d at 359.
132. Id
133. Id
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Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Saunders,134
relied on Eisenstadt to overrule two previous decisions 135 and hold that
a fornication statute1 36 violated the constitutionally protected right of
privacy. 137 The Saunders court stressed that the right of privacy pro-
tected personal decisions closely related to individual autonomy, 3 en-
compassing "freedom of personal development."'' 39 Looking to Carey
and Roe v. Wade, the court reasoned that it would be "rather anoma-
lous" to protect a procreation decision but not safeguard the "more
fundamental" decision to engage in sexual conduct-conduct that is "a
necessary prerequisite" to procreation. 41 In State v. H1/141 a New
Jersey superior court extended Saunders to apply to consensual, hetero-
sexual sodomy between adult partners who were not married to each
other. 142 The court held that the statute constitutionally could apply to
only forcible sodomy.143
Once the Pilcher and Saunders courts found interests protected by
the right of privacy, they employed strict scrutiny, requiring the states
to defend the challenged statutes as necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. 44 Without discussing any asserted state justifications, the
Picher court concluded that the state had not demonstrated a compel-
ling interest. 145 The Saunders court, however, analyzed and rejected
134. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
135. State v. Clark, 58 NJ. 72, 275 A.2d 137 (1971), and State v. Lutz, 57 N.J. 314, 272 A.2d
753 (1971), upheld the same fornication statute against a privacy challenge. The Saunders court
declared that Eirenstad, decided after Clark and Lutz, dictated their overruling. 75 N.J. at 215,
381 A.2d at 340.
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:110-1 (West 1969) (repealed 1978).
137. 75 N.J. at 213, 381 A.2d at 339. The facts of the case were in dispute. Two women
claimed that defendant and two other men had raped them. Defendant contended that the wo-
men had offered to have sex with the men in exchange for "reefers" and that after completion of
the sex acts, the women learned that the men had no "reefers," became angry, and reported the
incident as rape. The trial judge instructed the jury that if it believed defendant's account of the
facts, it should find him guilty of fornication, which he stated to be a lesser included offense of
rape. Id at 205, 381 A.2d at 335.
138. Id at 212, 381 A.2d at 339.
139. Id. at 213, 381 A.2d at 339.
140. Id at 214, 381 A.2d at 340.
141. 166 N.J. Super. 224, 399 A.2d 667 (Law Div. 1978).
142. Id at 233, 399 A.2d at 671-72. "This court is convinced that there is no basis for differen-
tiating between fornication and consensual sodomy between unmarried persons." d
143. Id, 399 A.2d at 671-72. The usual disclaimers about homosexual activity are noticeably
absent from the court's opinion. Id
144. 242 N.W.2d at 359; 75 N.J. at 217, 381 A.2d at 341.
145. 242 N.W.2d at 359.
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four asserted state interests.' 46
The state argued first that the statute was a valid health regulation,
designed to check the spread of venereal disease.147 The court found,
however, that the fear of contracting disease should be as great or
greater a deterrent to nonmarital sexual activity than would be the fear
of prosecution under the statute. 48 Furthermore, the statute might ac-
tually be counterproductive because it could deter venereal disease vic-
tims from seeking necessary medical treatment. 149
The Saunders court also rejected the state's argument that the forni-
cation statute promoted a state interest in preventing illegitimacy.' 50
Essentially following its reasoning on the state's venereal disease argu-
ment, the court responded that if the fear of unwanted pregnancy
would not deter sexual activity, then the fear of prosecution for fornica-
tion also would be of dubious deterrent value.15'
New Jersey also argued that the use of criminal sanctions for fornica-
tion protected the marital relationship.' 52 Specifically reserving judg-
ment on the underlying assumption that abstinence from sexual activity
induces marriage,'53 the court reasoned that the state's attempt to co-
146. 75 N.J. at 217-19, 381 A.2d at 341-42.
147. Id In Saunders'recognition of preventing venereal disease as a significant state interest is
the implicit assumption that a prohibition of nonmarital sexual activity, including the statutory
offense of fornication, would reduce the number of sexual contacts per person and thus necessarily
reduce the spread of venereal disease. This assumption, however, ignores enforcement difficulties.
148. 75 N.J. at 218, 381 A.2d at 341-42. The court noted that the maximum penalty under the
act was a fine of $50 and/or six months imprisonment. Id It looked to Carey for the proposition
that "absent highly coercive measures," it is extremely doubtful that people will be deterred from
engaging in extramarital sexual activities. Id
149. Id
150. Id
151. Id at 218-19, 381 A.2d at 342.
The state's interest in reducing illegitimate births is based, in part, on the assumption that there
is a greater likelihood of an illegitimate, as opposed to legitimate, child's needing state support.
See State v. Clark, 58 N.J. 72, 275 A.2d 137 (1971). The court's rationale for rejecting the state
interest in promoting marriage would have worked equally well here. See notes 152-55 infra and
accompanying text. If the statute attempted to coerce people into marrying or into having chil-
dren only after marriage, then the state is interfering with a procreation decision-a decision
clearly within the privacy protections. The state's interest in protecting its treasury cannot meet
the compelling state interest required of this sort of interference. Illegitimacy, like fornication,
may be abhorrent to the views of many people but, according to Saunders, those people may not
use the criminal sanction to force their beliefs on others. See notes 156-58 infra and accompany-
ing text.
152. 75 N.J. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342.
153. Id
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erce people into marrying was unconstitutional.154 Allowing the state
to use its fornication statute to promote what the court conceded might
otherwise be a socially beneficial institution "would undermine the
very independent choice which lies at the core of the right of pri-
vacy.'
155
Finally, the Court held that the state could not justify the statute as a
valid police power regulation of the public morals because only private
conduct was in question.1 56 Although fornication might be "abhorrent
to the morals and deeply held beliefs of many persons,"' 157 this concern
did not rise to the level of a compelling state interest. 58
154. Id
155. Id Saunders dismissed the state interest in promoting marriage without considering le-
gitimate reasons that the state might have for promoting-rather than coercing-marriage and the
traditional heterosexual family unit. The family has served as a basic unit for many governmental
services and, furthermore, has in the past provided economic and other support to its members
that the state might otherwise have to supply. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 81, at 595. See
also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("[Tlhe institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.").
156. 75 N.J. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342.
157. Id at 220, 381 A.2d at 342.
158. Many courts have recognized that the state's police power includes the ability to protect
public morals. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Soci-
ety] has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people. . . ."); Boston Beer
Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878) ("Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the
extent and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory
definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to. . .the preservation of good
order and the public morals."); People v. Costello, 90 Misc. 2d 431, 434, 295 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142
(Sup. Ct. 1977) ("The oft-repeated statement that morality cannot be legislated is fallacious; other
than traffic regulations virtually all penal law is legislation of morality. Society may not be able to
enforce morality, but it clearly can legislate it."). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, Com-
ment at 212 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Henkin, supra note 14, at 402-05; Schwartz, Morals, Of-
fenses, and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669-73 (1963); Wilkinson & White,
supra note 8, at 594-95.
A state might attempt to protect public morals by regulating three different types of conduct.
The first type comprises purely public conduct that is itself offensive or "immoral." A state, for
example, may forbid sex acts in public. At the other extreme is purely private conduct, such as
nonpublic sexual activity. The third type falls somewhere in between the two extremes and in-
cludes behavior that may be best described as public manifestations of private behavior. The
purchase of birth control products in a public place is an example of this type of conduct. State
regulation of the first type of conduct poses few problems. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (broadcasting obscenities over radio); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973) (viewing obscene movies in public theater). Regulation of the second and third
types of conduct, however, impinges on the right of privacy as established by the Supreme Court
and applied by Saunders and Plcher. Although the second type of conduct, purely private behav-
ior, would seem exempt from the state's police power, the mere existence of private behavior
considered by many to be deviate and immoral has been regarded as a sufficient justification for
regulation. See Schwartz, supra note 158, at 671 ("[The great majority of people believe that the
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Separate opinions in both Saunders'59 and Pilcher161 criticized their
respective majorities for failing to heed Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney, '61 the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of a three judge dis-
trict court's upholding of Virginia's sodomy statute as applied to
homosexuals.1 62 A declaratory judgment action, Doe held that Vir-
ginia's sodomy statute did not deprive adult male homosexuals-acting
consensually and in private-6 3 ---of their constitutional rights of due
process and privacy.'" The divided district court 16 ruled the conduct
in question to be "obviously no portion of marriage, home or family
life" and, therefore, unprotected by a constitutional right of privacy. 166
In addition, the court declared valid Virginia's criminalization of pri-
vate, homosexual sodomy because the statute was rationally related to
promoting "morality and decency" and preventing possible contribu-
tions to "moral delinquency."'
167
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance indicates only its accept-
morals of bad' people do, at least in the long run, threaten the security of the 'good' people ...
And that belief is not demonstrably false, any more than it is demonstrably true.'). Indeed, Saun-
ders recognized that some private behavior may, by its very existence, offend or outrage the sensi-
bilities of others. 75 N.J. at 220, 381 A.2d at 341. Saunders, however, rejected the assertion that
these concerns established a compelling state interest in the regulation of fornication. Id A sec-
ond public morals basis offered for the regulation of private behavior is that deviant or "immoral"
behavior might set an example that others would follow, thus changing the social norm. See
Wilkinson & White, supra note 81, at 594-95. This rationale offers a seemingly persuasive basis
for control of the third type of conduct, public manifestation of private behavior. The more prev-
alent the public manifestations are, the more threatening the possibility of a changing social norm
is likely to be. When the state regulates public manifestations of activity protected by the right of
privacy, however, it must demonstrate that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
159. 75 N.J. at 224, 381 A.2d at 344 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
160. 242 N.W.2d at 366 (Reynoldson, J., dissenting).
161. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aft'dmem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). For detailed discus-
sion of Doe, see Richards, Unnatural4cts and the Consfitutional.Right to Privacy: .4 Moral Theory,
1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 170; Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 553 (1976); 53 DEN. L.J. 553 (1976); 15 DUQ. U.L. REV. 123 (1976); 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
1281 (1977); 62 IOwA L. REV. 568 (1976); 65 KY. L.J. 748 (1977); 3 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 170
(1977).
162. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens would have noted probable jurisdiction and set
the case for oral argument. 425 U.S. at 901.
163. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975), aj'dmem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
164. Id. at 1203.
165. See id at 1203-05 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
166. Id at 1202.
167. Id Some commentators have criticized Doe for its reliance on statements made by Jus-
tice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961), and for its failure to cite any of
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ance of the lower court's result and not necessarily the lower court's
reasoning.168 Thus, the precedential impact of Doe on the facts before
the Pilcher and Saunders courts is uncertain. The Pilcher majority
never mentioned Doe, but pointed out that it was not deciding the con-
stitutionality of Iowa's sodomy statute as applied to homosexual acts. 69
The Saunders court asserted that it was "not inclined to read this con-
troversial case too broadly.17 Although it recognized that Doe was
"technically binding as precedent," the majority refused to extend
Doe's rationale to the facts before it. 7'
That Doe concerned homosexual conduct is probably sufficient to
distinguish it from Pilcher and Saunders. 7 2 The fornication statute in-
the Supreme Court's privacy decisions rendered since Griswold See 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 170; 53
DEN. L.J. 553 (1976); 15 DUQ. U.L. REV. 123 (1976); 65 Ky. L.J. 748 (1977).
The Doe majority also looked to traditional moral opinion and the longevity of Virginia's stat-
ute to support its holding. 403 F. Supp. at 1202-03, 1203n.2 ("[Tihe longevity of the Virginia
statute does testify to the State's interest and its legitimacy. It is not an upstart notion; it has
ancestry going back to Judaic and Christian law.") (citing Leviticus 18:22, 20:33).
168. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); cf. Hicks v. Mi-
randa, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (district court may not disregard summary dismissal for want of sub-
stantial federal question). See generally Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals.,
The Signffcance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. REv. 373
(1972).
169. 242 N.W.2d at 352. The dissent read Doe as finding that the conduct in question was not
protected by the right of privacy; it would have applied only a rational relation test of constitu-
tionality to the Iowa statute. Id at 366 (Reynoldson, J., dissenting).
170. 75 N.J. at 216, 381 A.2d at 340.
171. Id A concurring opinion, however, found Doe to be "totally incompatible with the sug-
gestion that the federal right of privacy protects 'individual autonomy.'" Id at 224, 381 A.2d at
344 (Schreiber, J., concurring). Justice Schreiber would have reached the majority's result solely
on the basis of the state constitution. Id at 220, 381 A.2d at 343 (Schreiber, J., concurring). A
dissenting justice agreed with the majority's reasoning and reading of the Supreme Court's privacy
decisions, but would have remanded the case for a determination on whether fornication was a
lesser included offense of rape. Id at 229, 381 A.2d at 347 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
172. Those courts that have dealt with privacy challenges to sodomy statutes as applied to
homosexual acts usually do not differentiate between the individual's right to privacy and the state
interests that might justify infringement upon that right. The enforcement pattern of sodomy
statutes causes part of the difficulty in this area. Law enforcement officials tend to enforce these
statutes only in situations in which the act involves force, minors, or public activity, including
public solicitation. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, Comment I at 278 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1953). See, e.g., Swikert v. Cady, 381 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (defendant convicted of
forcible sodomy has no standing to challenge statute's application to consenting adults); United
States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aj'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1973) (defendant
convicted of consensual sodomy that occurred in prison has no standing to challenge constitution-
ality of statute as applied to consensual acts in private); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d
368 (1973) (right of privacy does not apply to act that took place in parked automobile in well-
lighted parking lot); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967) (no standing
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validated in Saunders did not apply to homosexual activity; 173 more-
over, the Iowa court since Pilcher has distinguished between
homosexual and heterosexual sodomy. In State v. Langley174 the court
upheld, as applied to a forcible, public, 17 5 and homosexual act, the
same sodomy statute invalidated in Pilcher. 76 Although it indicated
that the decision to engage in private, consensual, homosexual conduct
does not fall within the protection of the right of privacy, the Court
held that either the forcible or the public nature of the act charged, as
well as its homosexual character, was sufficient to distinguish
Pilcher.177
In People v. Onofre178 a New York court distinguished Doe as merely
a declaratory judgment action. Confronted by a defendant who had
plead guilty to private, consensual, homosexual sodomy, the Onofre
court held that the right of privacy encompassed personal sexual activ-
ity, including "intimate consensual homosexual conduct." 17 9 Like
Pilcher and Saunders, 8 Onofre employed strict scrutiny to gauge the
constitutionality of the challenged statute.' 8 ' The court acknowledged
a legitimate state interest in regulating conduct offensive to the public,
but held that private, consensual activity cannot reasonably offend "a
public not embarked on eavesdropping." ' 2 Also recognizing a legiti-
mate state interest in preservation of the institutions of marriage and
the nuclear family, the court found this interest insufficient to rise "to
the level necessary to support the questioned legislation."' 8 3
Pilcher, Saunders, and Onofre incorporated private, consensual ac-
to raise privacy argument because act took place in public restroom); United States v. Buck, 342
A.2d 48 (D.C. 1975) (no standing because act took place in public wooded area); United States v.
Carson, 319 A.2d 329 (D.C. 1974) (right of privacy does not apply to defendant charged with
publicly soliciting an undercover police officer to engage in homosexual act); Hughes v. State, 14
Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972) (defendant convicted of sodomy with minor has no standing to
assert constitutionality of statute as applied to consenting adults).
173. See note 136 supra.
174. 265 N.W.2d 718 (Iowa 1978).
175. Id at 719-20. The court refused to grant defendant standing to raise a privacy challenge
to the statute as applied to private, consensual, homosexual sodomy. Id at 722.
176. Id at 722. See notes 124-33 supra and accompanying text.
177. 265 N.W.2d at 721-22.
178. - A.D.-, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980).
179. Id at 568.
180. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
181. - A.D.-, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (1980).
182. Id
183. Id at 569.
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tivity within the right of privacy and established that Doe is not dispos-
itive on this issue. Whether the Supreme Court will follow this
approach to privacy is uncertain. A plurality of the Court in Carey,
however, remarked that the Court has never definitively decided
"whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes
regulating such [private, consensual sexual] behavior among adults." 84
Nevertheless, lower court case law indicates, at the very least, that lan-
guage in the Court's privacy decisions is consistent with the concept of
a constitutional right of privacy that encompasses private, consensual
sexual activity.
V. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY APPLIED TO PROSTITUTION STATUTES
The exchange of money--commercialization-is the primary distinc-
tion between prostitution and other forms of consensual sexual activity.
If Pi/cher, Saunders, and Onofre have correctly construed the right of
privacy, a court faced with a right of privacy challenge should consider
whether commercialization affects (1) the status of the right to engage
in private, consensual sexual activity; and (2) the state's interests in reg-
ulating private, consensual sexual activity.
Because the typical method of enforcing prostitution statutes is to
arrest the prostitute for solicitation,1 85 defendants face a threshold
standing issue when raising a right of privacy challenge to prostitution
statutes. The appellate court in In re Dora P., 86 for example, dis-
missed the right of privacy challenge as irrelevant because the accused
had been charged with offering to engage in sex for a fee rather than for
actually performing the act.' 87 In so holding, the court stated that the
accused was asserting a right "to use the public streets to solicit" for
184. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977) (plurality opinion). In
dissent in Carey, Justice Rehnquist took sharp issue with the plurality's comment. "While we
have not ruled on every conceivable regulation affecting such conduct the facial constitutional
validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitively' established."
Id. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, concurring in Carey, took a somewhat
different position. "The Court apparently would subject all state regulation affecting adult sexual
relations to the strictest standard ofjudicial review. . . . In my view, the extraordinary protection
the Court would give to all personal decisions in matters of sex is neither required by the Constitu-
tion nor supported by our prior decisions." Id at 703 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
185. See J. JAMEs, supra note 3, at 50-52.
186. 68 A.D.2d 719, 418 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1979).




prostitution.18 8 The trial court,'8 9 however, characterized defendant's
claim as an assertion of the individual's right to decide "whether, when
and in what manner he or she will engage in private, intimate rela-
tions." 190
The appellate division's focus on solicitation is typical of the ap-
proach followed by those courts that find that negotiations occurring in
a public place do not come within the protection of the right of pri-
vacy.191 Thus, an Illinois appellate court declared that defendant's
right of privacy claim was "utterly at odds" with the conduct (solicita-
tion) for which she was arrested.' 92 A Delaware court held that a per-
son has no "right to publicly solicit and sell one's body."' 9 3 A District
of Columbia court rejected a right of privacy challenge, asserting, "We
are not confronted here with any adult's private, consensual sexual
conduct." 194
Defendants in these cases, however, did not claim any constitution-
ally protected right to solicit in public; rather, they claimed that the
right of privacy encompassed an individual's decision to engage in pri-
vate, consensual, commercial sexual activities. Had these courts recog-
nized that argument, it would have been necessary for them to consider
whether defendants were soliciting for an act that the state could val-
idly criminalize. Following the reasoning of these courts, however, no
defendant charged with soliciting for prostitution would be able to
188. Id at 731, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
189. 92 Misc. 2d 62, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Fain. Ct. 1977), rev'd sub non. In re Dora P., 68
A.D.2d 719, 418 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1979). See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text.
190. 92 Misc. 2d at 79, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
191. See Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Hicks v. State, 373
A.2d 205 (Del. 1977), a j'g 360 A.2d 150 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) and Blake v. State, 344 A.2d 260
(Del. Super. Ct. 1975); United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46 (D.C. 1975); State v. Gaither, 236 Ga.
497, 224 S.E.2d 378 (1976); People v. Johnson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 183, 376 N.E.2d 378 (1976); State v.
Price, 237 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. King, - Mass. -, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977).
King used this rationale even though the initial negotiations took place through a telephone con-
versation at defendant's home. Defendant and the undercover police officer made arrangements
to meet in a public place, where the final negotiations occurred. - Mass. at -, 372 N.E.2d at 203.
Another rationale for rejecting the privacy challenges to negotiation arrests is that it is inappo-
site to argue that the state may not regulate acts between consenting adults when, by definition,
one party to a solicitation or offer cannot have consented at the time the offer was made.. See
Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Silva v. Municipal Court, 40 Cal.
App. 3d 733, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1974).
192. People v. Johnson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 183, 189, 376 N.E.2d 381, 386 (1978).
193. Blake v. State, 344 A.2d 260, 262 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975), aIf'dsub nor. Hicks v. State, 373
A.2d 205 (Del. 1977).
194. United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 50 (D.C. 1975).
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raise a right of privacy challenge. Yet, the validity of a defendant's
solicitation charge is dependent on the constitutionality of the state's
criminalization of the acts solicited. Quite obviously, a state may pro-
hibit solicitation of a crime. 195 A state may also place an absolute ban
on advertisement of illegal products or services. 196  Either precept
would allow a state to prohibit solicitation for prostitution if the under-
lying prohibition of prostitution were constitutional. If, however,
criminalization of commercial sex is not constitutionally valid, then the
state may ban solicitation only as a reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation of public advertising. 197
Several state courts have simply stated that there is no fundamental
right to engage in prostitution. 19 Generally, these courts followed the
Supreme Court's "catalogue" approach, comparing the activity in ques-
tion to the list of those which the Supreme Court has found to be con-
stitutionally protected by the right of privacy,'99 and found insufficient
analogies between prostitution and the protected activities. 20 0 Instead
of first considering whether there is a constitutional right to engage in
nonpublic consensual sexual activities, these courts focused on whether
there is a constitutional right to engage in prostitution.20' When dis-
cussing the state's interests in prohibiting prostitution, these courts
stressed that they were employing the deferential level of scrutiny-the
rational relationship test.20 2 The Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Hen-
195. See general, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 58 at 414,
414-22 (1972).
196. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 767-80 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 651, 651-56 (1978).
197. L. TRIBE, supra note 196. This kind of time, place, and manner regulation could include
a ban on all public, in-person solicitation, provided that the ban does not "completely suppress the
dissemination ofconcededly truthful information" about prostitution, were prostitution legal. See
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977).
198. State v. Hicks, 360 A.2d 150 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976), a7'd, 373 A.2d 205 (1977); Blake v.
State, 344 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975), af'dsub nom. Hicks v. State, 373 A.2d 205 (1977); State
v. Gaither, 236 Ga. 497, 224 S.E.2d 378 (1976) (Hall, J., concurring); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d
813 (Iowa 1976).
199. See notes 92-111 supra and accompanying text.
200. Blake v. State, 344 A.2d 260, 262 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) ("This court would be con-
strained by logic and common sense from saying that those personal rights implicit in those cases
are the same or can be of the same order as the public sale of sex and the human body."), a.1 'dsub
non Hicks v. State, 373 A.2d 205 (1977); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Iowa 1976) ("We
do not believe prostitution is identifiable with or reasonably analogous to the kinds of sexual
conduct which have been recognized as within the constitutional right of privacy.").





derson,2 °3 is the only state high court to have considered a privacy chal-
lenge to a prostitution statute after previously finding constitutional
protections for noncommercial sexual activities.204 That court, how-
ever, did not even mention its Pilcher2°5 decision in rejecting the right
of privacy argument. Instead, the court relied on a pre-Pilcher case,
State v. Price,206 to hold that privacy protections do not "extend to the
activities of prostitutes in plying their trade. ' 2°7  The Iowa court, in
essence, was unwilling to find a sufficient analogy between the Supreme
Court's privacy cases and the sexual activity involved in prostitution.208
Because Pilcher, however, clearly recognized that the right of privacy
encompasses private, consensual sexual activity, the essential distinc-
tion between Henderson and Pilcher is the commercial nature of prosti-
tution.2 o9
Several state interests become more significant when private sexual
activities become the subject of commerce. First, some states have ar-
gued that prostitution is a source of income for organized crime,21 0 al-
though recent statistics show that this relationship may no longer
203. 269 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1978).
204. See State v. Henderson, 269 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1978).
205. State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976). See notes 124-133 supra and accompany-
ing text.
206. 237 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1976).
207. 269 N.W.2d at 406.
208. 269 N.W.2d at 818.
209. 269 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1978). If courts were to ask whether commercialism changes the
characterization of a fundamental right, they could find analogies in the demise of the commercial
speech doctrine. See generally Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080. In recent years the Supreme Court has held that advertising is entitled to
some first amendment protections; that is, mere commercialization no longer removes speech from
its place as a fundamental right. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). These cases support the argument
that the decision to engage in sexual relations, if protected by the right of privacy, should not lose
its zone-of-privacy protections simply because of commercialization.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Supreme Court examined the state
interests in curtailing dissemination of obscene materials, id at 57-60, and concluded that there is
no fundamental right to watch obscene movies in a public theater. Id at 66. The Court's focus on
state interests makes it unclear whether the commercialism and the public nature of the place
involved affect the characterization of the right in general or merely increase the state's interest.
Paris, because of its focus on the public nature of the place involved, would appear dispositive of
cases involving massage parlors that are open to the public. See, e.g., Brown v. Haner, 410 F.
Supp. 399 (W.D. Va. 1976); Garaci v. City of Memphis, 379 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1974);
Commonwealth v. Bucaulis, - Mass. App. Ct. -, 373 N.E.2d 221 (1978).
210. See, e.g., Blake v. State, 344 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975), a f'd sub nom. Hicks v.
State, 373 A,2d 205 (1977); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1976); In re P., 92 Misc. 2d 62,
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exist.2 11 In any case, prohibiting prostitution is probably an ineffective
way of promoting the state interest in preventing organized crime be-
cause the state usually enforces such statutes against street prosti-
tutes212 whose incomes are probably insufficient to interest large scale
organized crime.2 1
3
Some states have also asserted that their interests in prevention of
crimes connected with prostitution, such as robbery and assault, justify
prohibition of all prostitution.214 Some commentators, however, sug-
gest that prostitution's illegality increases the danger of these ancillary
crimes.215 Prostitute and patron alike are easy victims because their
participation in the illegal act renders them unlikely to report inciden-
tal crimes.216  Furthermore, even if prostitution were decriminalized,
some danger to the participants would remain because of the vulnera-
bility inherent in performing sex acts with strangers.2" 7
The state also has an interest in protecting the public from offensive
solicitation. Rather than completely prohibiting prostitution, however,
the state could promote its interest by directly regulating-or ban-
ning-only the offensive public activities.218 Prostitutes, for example,
400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Fain. Ct. 1977), rev'dsub nomL In re Dora P., 68 A.D.2d 719, 418 N.Y.S.2d 597
(1979). Accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12, Comment I at 171 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
211. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189 (1967). See also J. JAMES, supra note 3,
at 48.
212. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12, Comment 1 at 170-74 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); J. JAMES,
su~pra note 3, at 33-34; H. PACKER, supra note 9, at 328-29.
213. See V. BULLOUGH, supra note 22, at 190; Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 3, at 417-18.
214. See cases cited note 210 supra.
215. See J. JAMES, supra note 3, at 52, 97; Victim as Criminal, supra note 9, at 1243-44,
216. See J. JAMES, supa note 3, at 52, 97.
217. This risk of assault or robbery is present even if no money is exchanged. It increases with
the number of sexual contacts. Because most professional prostitutes have many more contacts
than do nonprofessional participants in sex acts, there is greater danger to persons engaging in
commercialized sex acts.
218. See notes 196, 197 supra and accompanying text. Several states raised this argument in
State v. Hicks, 360 A.2d 150, 152 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976), aj'd, 373 A.2d 205 (Del. 1977); Blake v.
State, 344 A.2d 260, 261 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975), af'dsub nom Hicks v. State, 373 A.2d 205 (Del.
1977); Commonwealth v. King, - Mass. -, -, 372 N.E.2d 196, 203 (1977); People v. Costello,
395 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (Sup. Ct. 1977); accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12, Comment 4 at 176
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 14, at 133.
The state's interest in protecting the public from offensive public manifestations of prostitution
is concededly valid. Uninterested men may be offended by solicitations; all members of the public
may be offended by the sight of prostitutes negotiating with potential customers on the public
streets. This justification, however, fails to recognize that men frequently greet nonprostitute wo-
men on the street with offensive invitations to engage in sex acts. See J. JAMES, supra note 3, at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/8
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could advertise their services in manners less offensive than street solic-
itation if private prostitution were not illegal.21 9
Similarly, the prohibition of prostitution is a relatively ineffective
way of advancing the state's interest in eliminating venereal disease.
Although prostitution concededly contributes to a certain amount of
venereal disease,220 nonprofessional, nonmarital sex accounts for the
greatest portion of this public problem.22'
Many commentators and courts have discussed, without much docu-
mentation, the effects of prostitution on marriages, 222 family units,
223
and public morals. 224 The threat to marriage from prostitution seems
less than that from noncommercial extramarital relationships, for there
420 n.25 1. Forbidding solicitation for prostitution is thus underinclusive because it fails to include
this type of offensive conduct, and overinclusive because it encompasses private solicitations that
do not offend the public.
219. The Wolfenden Committee explicitly recognized this possibility. "Another possible con-
sequence is an increase in small advertisements in shops or local newspapers. . . but we think
that this would be less injurious than the presence of prostitutes in the streets." THE WOLFENDEN
REPORT, supra note 14, at 156. See also Kaplan, supra note 9, at 593; Victim as Criminal, supra
note 9, at 1248 n.80. It is possible, however, that the offense to the public from the mere existence
of noncriminal prostitution would increase with advertisements in newspapers and other public
media. See note 158 supra.
220. C. WINICK & P. KINSIE, THE LIVELY COMMERCE 64 (1972). See People v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 338, 562 P.2d 1315, 138 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1977); Blake v. State, 344 A.2d 260, 262
(Del. Super. Ct. 1975), a ffdsub nom Hicks v. State, 373 A.2d 205 (1977); People v. Johnson, 60
Ill. App. 3d 183, 190, 376 N.E.2d 381, 386 (1978). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12, Com-
ment 1 at 170-74 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
Quarantine statutes, which authorize detention of persons convicted of prostitution for diagno-
sis and treatment of venereal disease, also would be rationally related to this goal. See, e.g., N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-5 (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-350 (1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12, Com-
ment I (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
221. Teenagers, whose sexual encounters are usually noncommercial, constitute the largest
group of venereal disease victims; the prostitute's most frequent patrons are in the 30-60 age
group. J. JAMES, supra note 3, at 48-49.
222. One of the arguments advanced by nineteenth-century reglementationists was that licens-
ing houses of prostitution would protect the purity of the home by preventing the spread of dis-
ease. D. PIVAR, supra note 22. Simone de Beauvoir suggested a somewhat different effect of
prostitution on marriage: "[A] caste of 'shameless women' allows the 'honest woman' to be treated
with the most chivalrous respect." S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 555 (1968).
If the danger to marriage and the family is that the father/husband will purchase the services of
a prostitute, the danger is real-most patrons of prostitutes are married men. J. JAMES, supra note
3, at 49.
223. See generally D. PIVAR, supra note 22, at 34-35, 40-43.
224. Courts that discuss "public morality" generally find it unnecessary to define this over-
worked phrase. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 111, 547 P.2d 6, 9-10 (1976); United
States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 54 (D.C. 1975); People v. Johnson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 183, 190, 376
N.E.2d 381, 386 (1978).
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is no need for emotional or romantic involvement in prostitution. If
the danger to family and public morals from prostitution is that young
women will choose prostitution over traditional careers and married
life, that danger is certain to remain so long as prostitution remains the
best-paying job for many women.225 Providing employment options
for these women would ameliorate this risk more effectively than
prohibiting prostitution.226
Most of these state interests would have little difficulty surviving the
rational basis test of constitutionality for commercial regulations. If,
however, the courts were to recognize that the commercial activity in
prostitution encompasses the exercise of a fundamental right of pri-
vacy, they would have to apply strict scrutiny to their prostitution stat-
utes. It seems unlikely that the states could show a complete
prohibition of prostitution to be necessary to achieve a compelling state
goal. In many cases, the prohibition is not at all successful in prevent-
ing the harm it was meant to remedy. Thus, characterization of the
right as fundamental or as "merely economic" appears to be outcome-
determinative.
CONCLUSION
There seems to be little chance that privacy challenges to prostitution
statutes will be successful in the future. Very few courts have been
willing to find that the decision to engage in private, consensual sexual
relations is a fundamental right. Even if courts were to recognize that
premise, however, they would be unlikely to find that commercialism
does not change the nature of the right and that the state's interest is
insufficient to allow interference with the right.
State courts, reluctant to interfere with legislative judgments, may
simply dismiss the argument with a reference to Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney.227 Nor is the Supreme Court, having avoided discus-
sion of the issue by its summary affirmance in Doe, likely to expand the
225. See V. BULLOUGH, supra note 22; THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 141, at 132;
Nossa, supra note 8.
226. Many prostitutes are uneducated women of the urban poor; a disproportionate number of
street walkers are minority group members. J. JAMES, supra note 3, at 40-41; accord, H. PACKER,
supra note 9, at 328-29.
There is evidence, however, indicating that a certain proportion of women engaged in prostitu-
tion would choose prostitution as a profession even if other occupations were available to them.
See J. JAMES, supra note 3, at 39-40; THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 14, at 131.
227. Courts are doing this already with challenges to sodomy statutes. E.g., State v. McCoy,
[Vol. 58:439
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right of privacy to include even noncommercial sexual behavior. Re-
formers intent on changing the legal treatment of prostitution, there-
fore, will be better served by focusing their efforts on state legislatures.
Catherine D. Perry
337 So. 2d 192 (La. 1976) (opposite sexes); People v. Penn, 70 Mich. App. 638, 247 N.W.2d 575
(1976) (same sex); State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976) (opposite sexes).
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